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a b s t r a c t
Let the cake be represented by the unit interval of reals, with players having private
valuations expressed by nonatomic probability measures. The aim is to find a cake division
which assigns to each of n players one contiguous piece (a simple division) in such a way
that the value each player receives (by her own measure) is the same for all players and
this common value is at least 1/n. It is known that such divisions always exist, however,
we show that there is no finite algorithm to find them already for three players. Therefore
we propose an algorithm that for any given ε > 0 finds, in a finite number of steps, a simple
division such that the values assigned to players differ by at most ε > 0.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper we deal with the problem of ‘fairly’ dividing a certain resource, called the cake, between n people (players).
The cake is represented by the interval [0, 1] of reals. Players have different opinions about the values of different parts of
the cake. We shall suppose that these valuations are private information of players.
Although people have been trying to divide things ‘fairly’ for a very long time, a rigorous mathematical theory of fair
division was established only after the SecondWorldWar [1]. We shall concentrate on equitable divisions, i.e. such that the
values of pieces assigned to all players are equal (according to their valuations). In the literature, other concepts of fairness
are considered, too. In a proportional division (sometimes called simple fair [2]) each player receives at least a 1/n part of
the cake according to her valuation, in an envy-free division no player thinks that she would be better off with somebody
else’s piece and an exact division assigns pieces such that everybody thinks that everybody’s piece has value exactly 1/n. It
is known that, in general, these properties are not equivalent, see e.g. [3,2], where also some other notions are defined and
the relations between them explored.
Equitability is not so popular as proportionality or envy-freeness. This notion has been studied e.g. by Dubins and Spanier
in [4], who proved the existence of pieces ensuring equitability, however, these pieces could be any members of a σ algebra
on [0, 1]. Alon [5] proved that equitable divisions for n players exist; however, in the worst case as many as n(n − 1) cut
pointsmay be necessary. Such divisionsmay be very impractical in real life. Imagine researchers who share a very expensive
apparatus needed for their experiments. If they had to come into the lab and leave it several times a day, theywould perhaps
rather give up such a kind of fairness. Therefore we are interested in cake divisions where each player receives a contiguous
piece. Such cake divisions will be called simple in this paper. They are specified by their cutpoints and the order of players.
✩ This work was supported by the VEGA grants 1/0325/10 and by VVGS PF48/2011/M.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: katarina.cechlarova@upjs.sk (K. Cechlárová), eva.pillarova@student.upjs.sk (E. Pillárová).
1572-5286/$ – see front matter© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.disopt.2012.08.001
250 K. Cechlárová, E. Pillárová / Discrete Optimization 9 (2012) 249–257
Simple equitable divisions were studied by Mawet et al. [6] for piecewise constant utility functions and by Aumann and
Dombb [7], who used the compactness of the set of all simple divisions. Cechlárová et al. [8] proved the existence of simple
equitable divisions for any number of players in any order.
In general, it is easier to prove the existence of a division fulfilling a certain property than to find such a division, see a
nice review in [2, Chapter 7]. In recent years, several papers studied what can be achieved by a finite algorithm. A finite cake
cutting algorithm, as specified by [2,9] or [10], uses a finite number of requests of two types issued to players:
(i) For a given value α ∈ [0, 1], determine the leftmost point x such that your value of the interval [0, x] is equal to α!
(cutting query)
(ii) For a given x ∈ [0, 1], what is your value of the interval [0, x]? (evaluation query).
With a little thought it is clear that with just one evaluation query and one cutting query or just two evaluation queries,
respectively, the answers to the following modified queries can be obtained:
(i′) For a given α ∈ [0, 1] and z ∈ [0, 1], determine the leftmost point x such that your value of the interval [z, x] is equal
to α!
(ii′) For given z, x ∈ [0, 1], what is your value of the interval [z, x]?
An exact definition of the allowed types of requests is necessary to prevent some ‘cheating’ algorithms that appear to be
finite but are unnatural in the field of cake cutting, see the discussion in [9] or [10]. However, we shall need one more type
of query, so far not considered in the literature, that cannot be realized by a finite number of cutting and evaluation queries
but does not spoil the spirit of a cake cutting algorithm:
(iii) For a given value α ∈ [0, 1], determine the rightmost point x such that your value of the interval [x, 1] is equal to α!’
(‘reverse’ cutting query).
In ourmodifiedmodel the complexity of the algorithmwill be given by the number of cutting, evaluation and reverse cutting
queries.
Notice that in the presented cake cutting model a finite algorithm does not require the knowledge of complete value
functions of players. Also the famous moving-knife algorithms [11,12] cannot be considered finite. There are even results
proving that no finite algorithm can exist for finding divisions of a certain type. Robertson andWebb [13] proved that there
exists no finite algorithm that produces an exact division for two players. Stromquist [10] showed that neither an envy-free
simple division among three players can be obtained by a finite algorithm.
Hence algorithms that produce a ‘nearly fair’ division are called for. Robertson andWebb [13,2] provided a finite algorithm
that, given a small ε > 0 and a set of real numbers α1, . . . , αn with
n
i=1 αi = 1, constructs a division such that for each
player i, the value of her piece differs from αi by at most ε. The main idea of the algorithm is the following. Player 1 cuts the
cake into pieces which she considers to be smaller than k each, where k is a small number determined by ε and n; in the case
of two players kmay be set to ε/2. Then player 2 can reduce any of the pieces (if necessary) so that each new piece will be
smaller than k according to her, etc. An ε-exact division is then produced by a suitable assignment of the obtained pieces to
players. A disadvantage of this algorithm is that many small pieces arise and those assigned to one player can be scattered
irregularly over the whole cake.
Another ε-exact division for two players can be obtained using the approach described by Simmons and Su in [14]. They
considered the so-called consensus-halving, i.e. a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believes
the portions are equal. (If n = 2, an exact division is obtained.) Simmons and Su showed, usingmethods from combinatorial
topology, namely theorems of Borsuk-UlamandTucker, that such a division exists, atmostn cuts are needed and this number
of cuts is the best possible. Moreover, they showed how a constructive proof of Tucker’s lemma yields a finite algorithm for
locating an ε-approximate solution that uses the minimal number of cuts.
In this paper we show that no finite algorithm can find a simple equitable division that is simultaneously proportional
for three players (and give a hint to a proof for an arbitrary number of players). We obtain this result by a modification of
Stromquist’s work [10], by constructing stiff measure systems. A finite algorithm for an ε-equitable simple division for two
players was proposed by Cechlárová and Pillárová [15]. Here we construct a finite algorithm that finds a near equitable
simple division for any number of players.
Notice that in ourmodel, unlike in several recent works, e.g. by Chen et al. [16], Arzi et al. [17] or by Caragiannis et al. [18],
it is not allowed to throw away any piece of cake. Under the assumption of free disposal it is easy to find an equitable
proportional simple division: it suffices to start from any proportional simple division and then trim all the pieces with
value exceeding 1/n.
2. Definitions and basic properties of divisions
Wewill consider the set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The cake is represented by the interval [0, 1]. In this work, the only
allowable portions — pieces are intervals [p, q], 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ 1. A cutpoint of two neighbouring pieces cannot belong to both
of them, but since in our model the value of a piece is not influenced by a single point, we shall represent all pieces as closed
intervals.
We shall suppose that each player i is endowed with a nonatomic probability measure Ui on the cake. Such a measure
can be represented by the distribution function Fi(x) = Ui(0, x), so that the measure of each interval [p, q] is equal to
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Fi(q) − Fi(p). The properties of the measure imply that the function Fi is nonnegative, nondecreasing and continuous on
[0,1] and Fi(0) = 0, Fi(1) = 1. If the distribution function Fi has a density fi, then
Ui(p, q) =
 q
p
fi(t)dt.
(Note that the terminology is perhaps not very intuitive in the context of cake cutting, however, the properties of distribution
functions and their densities are so well-known that we shall stick at it.)
A cake division D is a partition of the cake into n disjoint pieces; the piece assigned to player i in a division D will be
denoted by Di. The various fairness criteria are formulated in the following definition (see also [3,2] for other notions and
relations between them).
Definition 1. A cake division D = (D1,D2, . . . ,Dn) is said to be
(a) proportional, if Ui(Di) ≥ 1/n for each i ∈ N
(b) exact, if Ui(Dj) = 1/n for each i, j ∈ N
(c) envy-free, if Ui(Di) ≥ Ui(Dj) for each i, j ∈ N
(d) equitable, if Ui(Di) = Uj(Dj) for each i, j ∈ N .
Simple cake divisions are specified by their cutpoints and the order of players.
Definition 2. A simple cake division is a pair D = (d, ϕ), where d is an (n − 1)-tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1) of cutpoints with
0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn−1 ≤ 1, and ϕ : N → N is a permutation of N .
For technical reasons, we set x0 = 0 and xn = 1. Permutation ϕ in the division Dmeans that player i is assigned the interval
[xj−1, xj] if ϕ(j) = i. In what follows, we abbreviate the phrase equitable simple division by ESD. The common value that each
player receives in an ESD Dwill be denoted by E(D).
Cechlárová et al. [8] proved the following assertions:
Theorem 1. For any number of players n there exists an ESD for each players’ order. If the probability density function of each
player is everywhere strictly positive then in the given players’ order the ESD is unique.
The following assertion is mainly technical, but it has important consequences.
Lemma 1. Let D′ be any simple cake division for n players with players’ order π such that player i receives a piece with value
Ui(D′i). Then any ESD D with players’ order π fulfils
min{Uj(D′j), j = 1, 2, . . . , n} ≤ E(D) ≤ max{Uj(D′j), j = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proof. The first inequality was proved in [8]; we give here an analogous proof for the second one.
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that π is the identity permutation. Denote the cutpoints of the division D′ by
(d1, d2, . . . , dn−1) and the cutpoints of the equitable cake division D in the players’ order π by (e1, e2, . . . , en−1). Since D is
equitable, it suffices to show that Ui(Di) ≤ Ui(D′i) for some i.
We distinguish three cases:
(a) e1 ≤ d1. Then [0, e1] ⊆ [0, d1] and so U1(D1) ≤ U1(D′1).
(b) If there exists k such that ej > dj for each j = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1 and ek ≤ dk then [ek−1, ek] ⊂ [dk−1, dk]. Hence Uk(Dk) ≤
Uk(D′k).
(c) ej > dj for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Then [en−1, 1] ⊂ [dn−1, 1] and therefore Un(Dn) ≤ Un(D′n). 
We shall formulate two corollaries of Lemma 1. The first one claims that taking an ESD in a players’ order in which a
proportional simple division exists ensures that this ESD is also proportional. The second one says that even in the case
when there are several different ESDs with the same players’ order, the utility that they assign to players is the same.
Corollary 1. If D′ is a proportional simple division and D an ESD with the same players’ order then D is also proportional.
Corollary 2. If D and D′ are two ESDs with the same players’ order then E(D) = E(D′).
3. A finite algorithm does not exist
Although equitable simple divisions are sure to exist, they are not so simple to find. We give an independent proof
of the nonexistence of a finite algorithm capable of finding a proportional ESD. Our proof resembles the one given by
Stromquist [10] for the envy-free simple division for three players.
A stiff measure system (SMS for short) for three players L,M, R (for Left, Middle, Right) is a triple of probability densities
uL, uM , uR, defined by four parameters s, t, x, y, where 0 < s < 1/6, 2s+t = 1 and 0 < x < y < 1. The probability densities
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Table 1
Values in a stiff measure system.
[0, x] [x, y] [y, 1]
UL t s s
UM s t s
UR s s t
uL, uM , uR are everywhere positive and such that the values of intervals correspond to Table 1. The basic properties of a SMS
are described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If the three players L,M, R have a SMS with parameters s, t, x, y then the only proportional ESD has the players’ order
(L,M, R) and cuts in points x and y.
Proof. First we show that the only possible players’ order in a proportional simple division is (L,M, R).
Should player R be first, then shemust get an interval [0, z] such that z ≥ y. However, the value of the remaining piece is
smaller than 1/3 both forM as well as for L. IfM were first, then she must get an interval [0, z] such that z > x. Then player
L could not get a piece with value at least 1/3.
Hence we have that in any proportional simple division the first player must be player L. If playerM were last, then her
piece must be of the form [z, 1]where z < y. Then the piece that remains for player Rwould have a value smaller than 1/3.
Therefore the only possible players’ order is (L,M, R). Clearly, the cutpoints x1 = x and x2 = y give everybody a piece of
value t . Now Theorem 1 is sufficient for the uniqueness of the proportional ESD in this order. 
The following lemma is an analogy of Lemma 3 of [10]. Its interpretation is the following: even if one player knows
that the three probability densities form a SMS and she knows her probability density in full and the densities of other
players outside the neighbourhoods of suspected cutpoints, she alone is not able to determine the parameters of the SMS.
We formulate the assertion for player L, but analogous results hold for playersM and R.
Lemma 3. Let uL, uM , uR form a SMS with parameters s, t, x, y. Let η > 0 be arbitrary, δ > 0 be such that 2/3+ δ < t < 1− δ,
and let tˆ ≠ t be sufficiently close to t. Then there exists a SMS uˆL, uˆM , uˆR with parameters sˆ, tˆ, xˆ, yˆ for some sˆ, xˆ, yˆ such that
(i) uˆL(z) = uL(z) for all z ∈ [0, 1],
(ii) uˆj(z) = uj(z) for all j ≠ L and all z that are outside the η-neighbourhoods of x and y,
(iii) xˆ ≠ x, yˆ ≠ y, but both are within η-neighbourhoods of x and y, respectively;
(iv) 2/3+ δ < tˆ < 1− δ.
Proof. Our proof will do the following: The choice of tˆ (we will see later, how close to t this should be) will uniquely
determine the value of sˆ and the new cutpoints xˆ and yˆ, so as the probability density uL (since it has not changed) will
fulfil the requirements of the first row of Table 1 for t, s, x, y replaced by tˆ, sˆ, xˆ and yˆ.
Suppose that tˆ < t (the case tˆ > t can be treated similarly). This implies sˆ > s and since uˆL = uL we have xˆ < x and
yˆ < y. Given η > 0, we recall that UL(0, x) is a nondecreasing continuous function of x, so tˆ can be chosen in such a way
that it fulfils (iv) and xˆ, yˆ fulfil (iii).
Now it is sufficient to show that there exist probability densities uˆM and uˆR, identical with the probability densities uM
and uR outside the η-neighbourhoods of x and y such that together with uL they form a SMS with parameters sˆ, tˆ, xˆ and yˆ.
Namely, for playerM we have that the following relations have to be fulfilled:
UˆM(0, xˆ) = sˆ, UˆM(xˆ, yˆ) = tˆ, UˆM(yˆ, 1) = sˆ. (1)
Let us show that uˆM can be made constant in the intervals
(x− η, xˆ), (xˆ, x+ η), (y− η, yˆ), (yˆ, y+ η), (2)
so that the measure UˆM of player M fulfils row 2 of Table 1 (with the new parameters). Let us denote the values of these
constants by m1,m2,m3 (notice that m2 is the same for both middle intervals). Taking into account that uˆM = uM outside
the η-neighbourhoods of x and y, we have the following constraints:
UM(0, x− η)+m1(xˆ− (x− η)) = sˆ
UM(x+ η, y− η)+m2((x+ η − xˆ)+ (yˆ− (y− η))) = tˆ
UM(y+ η, 1)+m3(y+ η − yˆ) = sˆ
 . (3)
To ensure thatm1,m2,m3 can be positive, it is necessary and sufficient to have
UM(0, x− η) < sˆ, UM(x+ η, y− η) < tˆ, UM(y+ η, 1) < sˆ. (4)
The first and the third conditions in (4) hold trivially because UM(0, x − η) < s < sˆ and UM(y + η, 1) < s < sˆ. For the
second one let us realize that UM(x+ η, y− η) < t , so it suffices to choose tˆ in the interval [UM(x+ η, y− η), t] (this is the
second condition showing how close tˆ should be to t).
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Analogically, for player Rwe get the conditions
UˆR(0, xˆ) = sˆ, UˆR(xˆ, yˆ) = sˆ, UˆR(yˆ, 1) = tˆ. (5)
We shall make uˆR constant in the intervals (2) so that the measure of player R fulfils row 3 of Table 1 (with the new
parameters). Let us denote the values of these constants by r1, r2, r3 (again, r2 is the same for both middle intervals). We
have the following constraints:
UR(0, x− η)+ r1(xˆ− (x− η)) = sˆ
UR(x+ η, y− η)+ r2((x+ η − xˆ)+ (yˆ− (y− η))) = sˆ
UR(y+ η, 1)+ r3(y+ η − yˆ) = tˆ.
 (6)
r1 and r3 will be positive since
UR(0, x− η) < s < sˆ, UR(xη, y− η) < s < sˆ. (7)
To ensure that UR(y+ η, 1) < tˆ it suffices to choose tˆ so that it lies in the interval [UR(y+ η, 1), t] (the last condition for tˆ
to be close to t).
Hence the new probability densities will be everywhere positive and they will fulfil the requirements of the lemma. 
Theorem 2. There is no finite algorithm for finding a proportional ESD for three players. This assertion remains true even for three
players whose probability densities form a SMS.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is such an algorithm. Suppose that the probability densities uL, uM , uR of the
three players L,M, R form a SMS. We will show that after any finite number of steps, the algorithm is not able to determine
precisely the parameters of the SMS, in particular, to determine the cutpoints of the unique ESD.
At the beginning, suppose that the parameters of the SMS uL, uM , uR are s, t, x, y. Suppose that the algorithm has already
performed K steps, where K is any positive integer. If nomark has beenmade at x or y, the algorithm proceeds to step K +1.
On the other hand, if the algorithm made a mark at say x, Lemma 3 implies that all the marks made so far could have as
well been obtained for another SMS uˆL, uˆM , uˆR with parameters sˆ, tˆ, xˆ, yˆ: it suffices to take η such that no mark is within the
η-neighbourhood of x and y. So the algorithm has not found the correct cutpoints and it has to continue by another step. 
The technique used in this section can easily be extended to any number of players n ≥ 3. Let s be any positive number
such that s < 1/n(n− 1). We define t = 1− (n− 1)s. Obviously, t > (n− 1)/n > 1/n. There will be points x1, x2, . . . , xn−1
and the players’ measures will fulfil
Ui(xj−1, xj) =

s if j ≠ i
t if j = i.
It can be shown that the only players’ order ensuring proportionality is (1, 2, . . . , n)— it suffices to realize that for any i < n,
if a player j > iwere in position i, then her piece should end in a point y > xj, leaving not enough for the rest of players. In
this order there is again a unique ESD with cutpoints x1, x2, . . . , xn−1 that cannot be found in a finite number of steps.
We remark that the existence of a finite algorithm for finding any ESD (i.e. one that is not necessarily proportional)
remains open. The presented approach cannot be simply adapted to this case since when the probability distributions
form a SMS, equitable simple divisions in different orders than the only one ensuring proportionality may require cutpoints
different from x and y.
4. The near equitable algorithm
The algorithm that we propose in this section finds a proportional simple cake division such that the difference between
the values of pieces assigned to players is not higher than a predetermined value ε. We call this property of a cake division
ε-equitability:
Definition 3. Let D = (d, ϕ) be a simple cake division and ε > 0 a real number. D is called ε-equitable if
|Uϕ(j)(xj−1, xj)− Uϕ(k)(xk−1, xk)| ≤ ε for each j, k ∈ N.
The algorithm consists of three phases:
Phase 1. Ordering
Phase 2. Addition
Phase 3. Termination
4.1. Ordering
The purpose of Phase 1 is to find a players’ order in which a proportional simple division exists. There are several finite
and bounded algorithms to find a proportional simple division for n players, see e.g. Chapters 1 and 2 of [2]. The algorithm
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with the optimal number of queries, namely Θ(n log n) for n players, is the Divide and Conquer Algorithm of Even and
Paz [19], see also [9] for the proof of the lower bound on the number of steps in the Robertson–Webb cake cutting model.
Thanks to Corollaries 1 and 2 we know that any ESD taken with the players’ order determined in Phase 1 will give each
player a piece with the same value E ≥ 1/n.
4.2. Addition
In Phase 2 the algorithm actually tries to approximate the value E by constructing its binary expansion. Recall that a binary
expansion of a real number E ∈ [0, 1] is its expression in the form
E =
∞
k=0
ck · 1/2k (8)
where ck ∈ {0, 1} for each k.1 The jth partial binary expansion is
⌊E⌋j =
j
k=0
ck · 1/2k. (9)
Clearly, ⌊E⌋j ≤ E for each j, which will be used later.
Here we describe in detail just the case with 3 players and later we generalize these ideas to an arbitrary number of
players. Rename the players L,M, R according to the order obtained in Phase 1.
Phase 2 works in iterations. The piece of player L begins in point 0, the pieces of playersM and R immediately follow. As
the algorithm proceeds, the values of pieces for players L and M are kept mutually equal, and the right player R is ensured
the value that is not smaller.
In iteration j we want to decide whether cj = 1 or cj = 0 on the assumption that the (j − 1)st partial binary expansion
⌊E⌋j−1 has so far been correctly determined. In other words, all three players already have for sure a piece with value ⌊E⌋j−1
and we want to know whether their pieces can be enlarged by 1/2j. We do it by issuing three requests:
1. To player L: Tell the leftmost x1 such that UL(0, x1) = ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j.
2. To playerM: Tell the leftmost x2 such that UM(x1, x2) = ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j.
3. To player R: Is UR(x2, 1) ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j?
(Notice that it may happen that UM(x1, 1) < ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j. In that case the player is instructed to output x2 = 1.) We say
that iteration j is successful if the following condition holds:
UR(x2, 1) ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j (10)
otherwise the iteration is said to be unsuccessful. Connection between the success in an iteration and the corresponding digit
in the binary expansion of E is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For each j, the value of digit cj in the binary expansion of the equitable value E for the players’ order (L,M, R)
determined by the rule
cj =

1 if iteration j is successful
0 otherwise (11)
is correct.
Proof. We proceed by induction on j. Assume that the coefficients c0, c1, . . . , cj−1 in the binary expansion of E correspond
to the rule stated in the Lemma.
Suppose that iteration j is successful, i.e. condition (10) is fulfilled. Then the simple division with cutpoints x1 and x2
fulfils
UL(0, x1) = UM(x1, x2) = ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j, UR(x2, 1) ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j. (12)
Thanks to Lemma 1 the equitable value E for the players’ order (L,M, R) fulfils E ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j and so coefficient cj has
been correctly determined to be equal to 1.
Conversely, suppose that iteration j was unsuccessful, but still the value E of an ESD with the players’ order (L,M, R)
fulfils E ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j. Let us denote the cutpoints of one such division by x′1 and x′2. It is clear that the leftmost point x1
such that UL(0, x1) = ⌊E⌋j−1+1/2j must fulfil x1 ≤ x′1 and the leftmost point x2 such that UM(x1, x2) = ⌊E⌋j−1+1/2j fulfils
x2 ≤ x′2. Since UR(x′2, 1) ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j, condition (10) is also fulfilled, and we get a contradiction with the assumption
that iteration jwas unsuccessful. 
1 Notice that some reals have two different binary expansions. Namely the two expansions {ck} and {c ′k} are such that there exists j with cj = 1 and
ck = 0 for each k > j and c ′j = 0 and c ′k = 1 for all k > j (compare e.g. [20]). Due to the organisation of the Addition phase, we will always obtain an
expansion of the first type.
K. Cechlárová, E. Pillárová / Discrete Optimization 9 (2012) 249–257 255
Fig. 1. Algorithm Termination.
The algorithm may terminate any time with an equitable division if player R says that UR(x2, 1) = ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j. If this
does not occur sufficiently early, we can proceed to Termination phase as soon as 1/2j < ε.
4.3. Termination
Let us summarize the situation immediately after iteration j finished and before the algorithm enters the Termination
phase. Themarks aremade at points x1 and x2 and the values of pieces fulfil relations (12). The purpose of the Termination
phase is to decide how to divide the cake to ensure that the values of final assignments do not differ by more than ε from
each other and also from the equitable value E (notice that if the cuts were made at x1 and x2, player Rmight get too much).
A suitable division will be obtained by following the steps of the decision tree described in Fig. 1. For brevity, we shall
introduce the notation
⌊E⌋+j = ⌊E⌋j + 1/2j.
It is easy to see that (recall that we have the binary expansion of the first type)
⌊E⌋j ≤ E < ⌊E⌋+j . (13)
We shall also use the symbol ⌊E⌋∗j to denote an unknown (arbitrary) number in the interval [⌊E⌋j, ⌊E⌋+j ].
Theorem 3. If Termination is entered after iteration j such that 1/2j < ε then the values of the pieces assigned to players (by
each one’s own measure) differ by at most ε.
Proof. It can be easily seen that all the possibilities when trying to assign to players in the order (L,M, R) pieces with value
⌊E⌋+j have been checked. Let us review in detail what happens in which case.
Condition y2 ≤ x2 means that the value of piece [x2, 1] for player R is between ⌊E⌋j and ⌊E⌋+j . If y2 > x2 we cut in y2
to give player R a piece with value ⌊E⌋+j and now try to give player M a piece with value ⌊E⌋+j that finishes in y2. This is
impossible if y1 < x1, so cutting in points x1 and y2 gives the players the pieces with values as stated in line 6 of Fig. 1.
Finally, if y1 ≥ x1, we know (thanks to Lemma 1) that giving to both M and R a piece with value ⌊E⌋+j (by cutting in y1
and y2), player L cannot obtain also so much. So making the first cutpoint in y1 ensures for player L a value between ⌊E⌋j
and ⌊E⌋+j .
As we entered the Termination phase after iteration j such that 1/2j < ε, we see that ε-equitability is ensured. 
5. Generalization to an arbitrary number of players
We described the Addition and the Termination phase of our ε-equitable algorithm in detail for three players. Now
we explain how these ideas can be used for an arbitrary number of players.
5.1. Addition
In iteration jwe successively issue the requests (recall that x0 = 0):
For player i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1:
Tell the leftmost point xi such that Ui(xi−1, xi) = ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j
For player n: Is it true that Un(xn−1, 1) ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j?
(If anybody thinks that Ui(xi−1, 1) < ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j, she says xi = 1.)
Again we say that iteration j is successful if the following condition holds:
Un(xn−1, 1) ≥ ⌊E⌋j−1 + 1/2j; (14)
otherwise the iteration is said to be unsuccessful. Connection between the success in an iteration and the corresponding digit
in the binary expansion of E is the same as that in Lemma 4; we state the assertion without proof.
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Fig. 2. Termination for n players.
Lemma 5. For each j, the value of digit cj in the binary expansion of the equitable value E for the players’ order determined in the
Ordering phase of the algorithm by the rule (11) is correct.
5.2. Termination
Termination phase can be entered (unless the algorithm ends earlier with an equitable division) as soon as 1/2j < ε.
Its purpose is to ensure that nobodywill get toomuch.We first describe intuitivelywhat this phase does. In the course of this
phase we will have left players 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 who are all temporarily assigned pieces of the value exactly ⌊E⌋j separated
by temporary cutpoints x0 = 0, x1, . . . , xi−1. Right players i + 1, . . . , n have definitive pieces with value ⌊E⌋+j and their
cutpoints yi, yi+1, . . . , yn−1, yn = 1 are definitive. Player i competes with her neighbours for piece X = [xi−1, yi] whose
value is not yet known, we only know that its value for player i is not smaller than ⌊E⌋j. At first, all players are left players,
piece X touches the right-endpoint of the cake and we ask player n to tell the right-most cutpoint yn−1 such that the piece
[yn−1, 1] has the value ⌊E⌋+j . If yn−1 ≤ xn−1, we know that the value of the piece [xn−1, 1] for player n is not bigger than ⌊E⌋+j ,
so we can cut in points x1, . . . , xn−1 to achieve ε-equitability. If yn−1 > xn−1 then point yn−1 is made a new cutpoint, player
n is made a right player, the new piece X is [xn−2, yn−1] and we ask player n− 1 to tell the rightmost cutpoint yn−2 such that
the piece [yn−2, yn−1] has the value ⌊E⌋+j . Moving this way the piece X to the left, at latest player 1 will think that the value
of piece X is smaller than ⌊E⌋+j (however, remember that it is not smaller than ⌊E⌋j) and we can cut. A formal description of
this algorithm is given in Fig. 2. The correctness of this procedure can easily be verified.
5.3. Computational complexity of the algorithm
Ordering phase can be performed in optimal Θ(n log n) queries, if the algorithm Divide and Conquer of Even and Paz
is used (see [19,9]). In the Addition phase, if ε-approximation is required, then log 1/ε iterations are needed to achieve
the piece size 1/2j < ε. There are n queries per iteration, so O(n log 1/ε) steps are necessary. Finally, in the Termination
phase in the worst case at most n − 1 reverse cutting queries and one comparison of real numbers per each query will be
made. This is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. A proportional ε-equitable cake division for n players can be computed in O(n(log n + log 1/ε)) queries of the
allowed type.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we proved that in spite of the positive existence results, it is impossible to find a proportional equitable
division forn ≥ 3players, if everybody is to receive one contiguous piece. On the other hand,weproposed a simple algorithm
that finds a division for n players such that the values assigned to players (by everybody’s own measure) are all at least 1/n
and they differ by no more than a predetermined small value.
Notice, however, that in our near equitable algorithm we needed a ‘reverse-cut’ query that has so far not been used
in the cake-cutting literature. We leave it as an open question whether an algorithm that uses only the standard cut and
evaluation queries to accomplish this task is possible. We remark that in the two-players case, for the near-equitable
algorithm proposed in [15] it suffices that players announce ANY point x such that their value of the interval [0, x] is equal
to a given α ∈ [0, 1].
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